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Practicing politics with Foucault and Kant: toward a critical life
Dianna Taylor
Michel Foucault’s philosophy evokes ambivalent responses with respect to questions of politics. The
most frequently cited reason for this ambivalence is Foucault’s perceived failure to provide the normative
framework that political endeavors are believed to require.1 Some philosophers and political theorists argue,
however, that while Foucault’s work is indeed not normative in a traditional sense, it nonetheless reflects
certain normative commitments.2 The question of whether a ‘mere’ commitment provides sufficient
grounds for an emancipatory politics has been particularly important for feminists. While many feminists
find Foucault’s work useful in identifying and diagnosing oppressive situations and contexts, the majority
still believe that he cannot provide for ways of actively resisting oppression.3 Other feminists find
Foucault’s work apolitical at best.4
In this essay I respond to the claim that Foucault’s work is normatively lacking and therefore
possesses only limited political relevance. Foucault was indeed wary of the normalizing function that he
believed norms frequently serve, but his critical interrogation of norms is not merely negative or
destructive.5 Rather, Foucault intends to identify conditions under which norms become normalizing,
clarify the oppressive nature of normalization, and create opportunities for developing non-normalizing and
therefore emancipatory modes of existence. I argue that, through his appropriation of Kant’s notion of
critique, Foucault reconceptualizes normative political concepts such as obligation, freedom, autonomy and
publicity in non-normalizing and therefore politically compelling ways. I also question the current reliance
upon normativity as a source of legitimation in political theory and action. Subjecting norms, including the
norm of normativity, to critical analysis may lead to their reformulation in ways that deprive them of
foundational status, but it need not result in their destruction or abandonment. Indeed, from a Foucauldian
perspective, such critical analysis increases possibilities for the practice of freedom.
I begin my analysis by drawing out the notion, as articulated in Foucault’s work, of critique as a
mode of existence rather than a philosophical method. The primary purpose of this analysis is to elucidate
the political potential of the self-practices that comprise a Foucauldian ethos, potential that has been
undertheorized. Foucault’s treatment of practices of the self is, however, unsystematic; he speaks of ‘selfcreation’ in different ways within a variety of texts. 6 In order to clarify as much as possible the
politicization of practices of the self that I see occurring within Foucault’s work, therefore, I mark a
distinction (which Foucault himself does not) between two general forms that critique as a mode of
existence may take: an ‘aesthetics of existence’ and a ‘way of life’. Foucault develops the notion of an
aesthetics of existence in Volumes II and III of The History of Sexuality, as well as in later lectures and
interviews. The notion of a way of life is briefly discussed in the essay ‘Friendship as a Way of Life’
(1997c). As I see it, the distinction between an aesthetics of existence and a way of life is twofold: an
aesthetics of existence is transformative and its effects are not limited to the individual; a way of life is
transgressive and public.7 The significance of this distinction (which shall be elaborated and clarified later
in the essay) is that transgressive and public practices are particularly relevant for emancipatory political
endeavors within the current socio-historical context.
I proceed by arguing that the non-normalizing and therefore emancipatory character of a way of life
emerges within Foucault’s work on Kant, and I analyze both thinkers’ responses to the question ‘What is
Enlightenment?’ in order to support my claim. I show how Foucault reconceptualizes the concepts of
obligation, autonomy, freedom and publicity in non-normalizing ways and suggest that his work can
facilitate a similar reconceptualization of political unity. I refer to the public, transgressive, emancipatory
mode of existence that I sketch out by way of this analysis as a ‘critical life’ in order to emphasize the shift
toward the political that occurs in Foucault’s work on Kant, as well as to underscore its debt to Kant
himself. The movement that I trace from an aesthetics of existence to a critical life is, therefore, movement
from a mode of existence that lacks current political relevance to one that possesses a high degree of
political potential given prevailing socio-political conditions. I conclude with a preliminary investigation
into the political efficacy of a critical life by discussing its relevance specifically for feminist politics.
An aesthetics of existence or ‘art of living’ as articulated and practiced by the ancient Greeks,
according to Foucault, constitutes a mode of existence ‘whose moral value did not depend either on one’s
being in conformity with a code of behavior, or on an effort of purification, but on certain formal
principles’ through which one ‘distributes’, ‘observes’ the particular limits of, and ‘stratifies the use of

pleasures’ (Foucault, 1990: 89). Foucault describes an art of living in terms of the practices of which it is
comprised, ‘those intentional and voluntary actions by which men seek not only to set themselves rules of
conduct, but also to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make their
life an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria’ (1990: 10–11). An
aesthetics of existence has ethical significance, and this significance may be located, at least in part, in the
distinction between ‘acts and moral code’ (Foucault, 1997a: 263). ‘The acts’, according to Foucault, ‘are
the real behavior of people in relation to the moral code imposed on them’ (1997a: 263). The moral code
regulates behavior not only through prescribing what kinds of behaviors are ‘permitted or forbidden’, but
also through assigning ‘positive or negative value [to] the different possible behaviors’ (ibid.).8 For
Foucault, ethics refers to a particular class of behaviors, which he refers to as ‘the relationship you ought to
have to yourself’ (ibid.). This rapport à soi ‘determines how the individual is supposed to constitute
himself as a moral subject of his own activities’ (ibid.).
The nature of the ‘self’ or subject and its relationship to such practices is frequently misconstrued.
Some readers see Foucault presenting the self or subject as an authentic, unfettered entity whose possible
options and ability to choose among those options are unrestricted and, therefore, ‘free’. That is, the self
appears to be the origin and creator of the practices that in turn express it. Foucault’s description of
practices of the self as occurring within the context of moral regulation, together with his claim that such
practices form a relationship one ‘ought’ to have with oneself, suggest, however, that self-creation is not an
unconstrained activity; while one does indeed constitute oneself as a subject through self-practices, doing
so does not extricate one from prevailing social, political and ethical conditions. While we are able to
decide how, when and in what way we engage in a particular set of practices (our actions are ‘voluntary
and intentional’), these decisions are always limited (though not determined) by our social context. The
idea that transformation occurs in and through constraint, moreover, calls into question the idea that the self
is necessarily prior to action. Foucault problematized the idea that ‘there exists a human nature or base that,
as a consequence of certain historical, economic, and social processes, has been concealed, alienated, or
imprisoned in and by mechanisms of repression’ (Foucault, 1997b: 282). Practices of the self do not, nor
are they intended to, ‘break . . . repressive deadlocks’ and ‘reconcile man with himself’ (ibid.). Selfcreation is not a process of discovering one’s ‘true self’ but of (re)inventing oneself through practices that
are simultaneously transforming and constraining. As David Halperin puts it, practices of the self
‘cultivate’ that part of the self that is ‘most impersonal . . . namely the capacity to “realize oneself” by
becoming other than what one is’ (Halperin, 1995: 76; original emphasis).
Foucault connects the cultivation of this impersonal part of the self with ‘aesthetics’ or ‘style’.
‘From the idea that the self is not given to us,’ he argues, ‘there is only one practical consequence: we have
to create ourselves as a work of art’ (Foucault, 1997a: 262). Again, Foucault does not conceive of this selfcreation in terms of authenticity. Given that the self is not ontologically prior to its practices, he argues, ‘we
should . . . relate the kind of relation one has to oneself to a creative activity’ (ibid.). As Halperin points
out, notions of ‘aesthetics’ or ‘style’ as they pertain to practices of the self are not reducible to either the
‘fin-de-siècle aestheticism typically associated with Oscar Wilde’ or the ‘ “dandyism” championed by
Baudelaire’ (1995: 73).9 The notion of style, rather than signifying something like the ‘California cult of the
self’, refers to ‘a rigorous, austere, and transformative technology of the self which produces concrete
possibilities for the development of personal autonomy’ (1995: 74).
A second misconception about practices of the self is that they are merely personal or individual.
That an aesthetics of existence and practices of the self constitute a relationship of the self to itself seems to
suggest that one ‘works on oneself’ completely independent of others. Foucault’s descriptions and analyses
of self-creation, however, consistently illustrate its social character. If practices of the self are constrained
by a normative moral code, as Foucault argues they are, it follows that they occur within a social context.
Foucault makes clear in Volumes II and III of The History of Sexuality that self-creation is the product of
and in turn reproduces relations both with social institutions and with other people. ‘Caring’ for oneself
involves self-governance, which in turn implies caring for and governing others; it is through properly
caring for oneself that one is able to ‘occupy his rightful position in the city, the community, or
interpersonal relationships’ (Foucault, 1997b: 287). Moreover, proper care of the self is made possible by
way of the fundamental relationship between student and master (1997a).
Within the context of an aesthetics of existence, then, practices of the self do not authenticate a self
that is predetermined and autonomous in a classical Kantian sense. Nor do such practices constitute a
merely individual or personal ‘lifestyle choice’. That such practices are transformative, that they facilitate
the development of new ways of acting and thinking, suggests that they have political potential. For a mode
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of existence comprised of practices of the self to be politically relevant within the present socio-historical
context, however, I believe that two aspects of self-creation and self-transformation must be stated more
positively and strongly.
First, practices of the self must be public, where ‘publicity’ expresses in a positive manner the idea
that practices of the self are not merely individual. That is, self-creation must go at least some way toward
facilitating non-normalizing connections between subjects and, more specifically, non-normalizing
collective political action. Iris Marion Young’s notion of a ‘politics of inclusion’ and Melissa Orlie’s
conception of ‘politically constituted commonality’ can help to illustrate what I mean by this kind of
connection or collectivity (Young, 1990: 119; Orlie, 1997). Young describes a politics of inclusion as
forming ‘a heterogeneous public . . . in which persons stand forth with their differences acknowledged and
respected, though perhaps not understood, by others’ (1990: 119). Orlie describes politically constituted
commonality as ‘the conception of the political constituted by organized multitudes’, and distinguishes it
‘from an ontologically common sense of the world, a public sphere oriented toward agreement (either as
actuality as or regulative ideal), and a sovereign unity or community’ (1997: 82). Orlie further clarifies her
idea when she states that politically constituted commonality is characterized by ‘[p]olitical enactment of
the interdependence of commonality and plurality’ (ibid.). Insofar as Orlie is using the term ‘plurality’ in
the specifically Arendtian sense in which it connotes a condition such that persons are distinct from insofar
as they are connected to one another, her notion of politically constituted commonality offers a vision of
politics where differences are a condition for the possibility of collective political activity. Her formulation
therefore builds upon or in a sense springs from Young’s; if persons cannot be present in their differences
to and be taken seriously by others, such differences cannot be politically relevant phenomena in the way
that Orlie describes. The idea that differences do not simply characterize but are actually fundamental to
politics is, I think, an important one for current emancipatory political endeavors generally, but particularly
within a pluralist context.10
Even from the brief description Foucault provides in ‘Friendship as a Way of Life’, it seems
apparent that practices of the self as they constitute a way of life are public in the sense described above. A
way of life as Foucault conceives of it involves engaging in self-practices in ways that facilitate new (not
yet conceptualized and non-normalizing) forms both of relating to oneself and of connecting with others.
Foucault presents friendship as one such form of connection. ‘A way of life’, he states, ‘can be shared
among individuals of different age, status, and social activity. It can resemble intense relations not
resembling those that are institutionalized. It seems to me that a way of life can yield a culture and an
ethics’ (1997c: 138). As expressive of a way of life, friendship does not somehow replace (and thereby
release subjects from) the normalizing, ‘institutionalized’ relations that characterize a disciplinary society.
Nor does it involve accepting existing modes of relating and simply trying to arrange them in new ways.
Rather, differences (‘age, status, and social activity’) among individuals are fundamental to friendship as a
mode of relating to others. One adopts a critical stance toward ‘socially acceptable’ relationships, adjusts
the manner in which one relates to others, and connects with those with whom one ostensibly has nothing
in common. Friendship as a way of life begins from a position of critical resistance, not acceptance, and
from that position attempts to create something new: it is produced by and in turn fosters critical and
creative capacities among and between subjects. As I see it, Foucault’s notion of a way of life constitutes a
positive response to the failure of traditional forms of connection: in reconceptualizating friendship he
seems to be offering an initial formulation of non-normalizing relations among persons.
Second, as the above discussion of publicity suggests, the transformative character of practices of
the self must have a critical component. Practices of the self must not only bring about change but in doing
so must call into question the necessity of current modes of thought and action. These elements of critique
and creation are interconnected in Foucault’s notion of transgression. In its most general sense,
transgression for Foucault means challenging pre-existing or given limits. Yet, for him, limits and their
transgression are mutually constitutive; limits would be in a sense meaningless if they were not crossed,
and transgression similarly derives its meaning by way of that crossing: ‘[t]he limit and transgression
depend on each other for whatever density of being they possess’ (Foucault, 1977: 34). Thus, while
transgression is indeed critical, it is not merely negative. Rather, Foucault conceives of limit and
transgression as involved in a kind of ‘instantaneous play’ through which transgression comes to
accomplish not ‘victory over limits’ but the ‘nonpositive’ affirmation of ‘limited being’ (1977: 35).
Foucault’s point here seems to be that persons need not (nor can they) somehow get outside of their current
context – break free from their current limits, as it were – in order to act or create change. Persons must
instead focus on recognizing and identifying – clarifying – the limits that constrain them and work for
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change from within the space between limits and their transgression; the play between transgression and
limit is a condition for the possibility of new modes of existence, hence the importance of creating and
striving to maintain conditions under which this play may occur.
The transgressive character of self-practices is evident in Foucault’s essay ‘What is
Enlightenment?’. There Foucault outlines an ‘ethos’ which he describes specifically in terms of selfpractices: ‘work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings’ (Foucault, 1984: 47). As described
in ‘What is Enlightenment?’, this work that persons perform on themselves does not extricate them from
their current limits, but it does enable them to identify and clarify those limits, and in doing so to ‘separate
out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or
thinking what we are, do, or think’ (1984: 46). Practices of the self are transgressive in that they challenge
given limits in productive ways; their aim, as Foucault puts it, is to ‘grasp the points where change is
possible and desirable, and to determine the precise form this change should take’ (ibid.). A life
characterized by self-practices does not, therefore, merely entail rejecting what is given, but rather involves
critically transforming it.
Thus far I have outlined the political potential of practices of the self by arguing that, as they
comprise an ethos conceived specifically as a way of life, they possess a public and transgressive character.
In what follows I analyze points of intersection and departure between the Kantian and Foucauldian
perspectives on the question ‘What is Enlightenment?’ in order to support my claim that Foucault’s
politicization of practices of the self reflects a penchant for emancipatory change.
Kant conceives of enlightenment as a way for humanity to emerge from immaturity (Kant, 1983).
Immaturity as Kant understands it is a state in which persons are under the tutelage of others such that they
do not exercise their own reason: ‘Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity . . .
immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and
courage to use [reason] without guidance from another’ (Kant, 1983: 41; original emphasis).11 The ‘motto
of the Enlightenment’ is therefore formulated as ‘sapere aude!’, or ‘[h]ave the courage to use your own
understanding’ (ibid.). Kant is concerned specifically with reason in its public use. The private use of
reason, he argues, ‘may . . . often be very narrowly restricted, without otherwise hindering the process of
enlightenment’ (1983: 42). Persons utilize private reason in their roles as civil servants, such as the
‘clergyman’ who reasons ‘for the sake of his congregation’ (1983: 43). The clergyman is constrained in his
use of reason by Church doctrine (‘he is acting under instructions from someone else’), his audience (he is
acting in the interests of a particular and limited group of people), and ‘civic duty’ (he must not criticize
public policy) (ibid.).12 Because the private use of reason is contingent, Kant argues that it cannot be free.
Persons do, however, occupy another role within society. In this role of ‘scholar’, individuals may
‘publicly express [their] thoughts regarding the impropriety or even injustice’ of state policies (1983: 43).
In fact, Kant goes so far as to say that in this role persons are ‘called’ to ‘impart to the public all of [their]
carefully considered and well-intentioned thoughts’, where the notion of a ‘calling’ implies a sense of
obligation (ibid.). Moreover, insofar as ‘the public’ for Kant means ‘the world’, as scholars persons are not
constrained by their audiences as they are in their roles as civil servants. In public reason one achieves ‘an
unrestricted freedom to use his own rational capacities and to speak his own mind’ (ibid.). Because the
public use of reason is free, it alone can bring about enlightenment: ‘[n]othing is required for this
enlightenment however, except freedom; and the freedom in question is . . . the freedom to use reason
publicly in all matters’ (1983: 44; original emphasis). Given that reasoning publicly is unique to persons
insofar as they are part of a larger social and political body, yet still distinct individuals, this use of reason
creates, and positions persons within, a context distinct from that of both ‘private individual’ and ‘human
being’.
This unique positioning of persons such that they are able to use their own reason without authority
raises a problem for Kant that takes the form of a potential crisis of legitimation. Establishing and
maintaining the conditions for the possibility of the public use of reason, while important, is not sufficient
from a Kantian perspective. This use of reason must be, more specifically, legitimate. Within Kant’s critical
philosophy, legitimation is achieved by way of obedience: we must not try to know what we cannot know;
we are free insofar as we subject ourselves to the moral law. The problem arises out of the fact that
enlightenment, a characteristically disobedient use of reason (we are to use our reason without the guidance
of others), simultaneously facilitates (by combating immaturity) and threatens to undermine (by
questioning the necessity of metaphysical foundations) human progress.13 Enlightenment is characterized
by a use of reason that can be legitimate without being obedient in the sense of adhering to predetermined
boundaries or limits. Neither private reason, which is practiced insofar as one functions as ‘a cog in a
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machine’, nor universal reason, which is practiced insofar as one is a human qua human, are potentially
transgressive in this way (1983: 42).
Foucault argues that Kant ultimately legitimizes and, therefore, curtails the transgressive potential of
his notion of enlightenment by way of his notion of critique. It is through critique, Foucault argues, that
Kant asserts the command to obey: ‘[a]rgue as much as you want and about what you want, but obey!’
(1983: 45; original emphasis). The public use of reason may be considered free when the authority of an
enlightened ruler legitimates it. Like reason, then, freedom is characteristically obedient: we reason as free
and autonomous subjects when we fulfill our obligation to respect the restrictions imposed by the command
to obey, whether generated internally (by way of autonomy) or externally (by way of political authority).
While ultimately very different, Foucault’s treatment of practices of the self as a way of negotiating
the loss of metaphysical foundations in his own essay, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, nonetheless parallels
Kant’s treatment of public reason in some important respects. Foucault makes use of the same basic
concepts that are significant for Kant (obligation, autonomy, freedom, publicity), yet because he exploits
the transgressive potential implicit in Kant’s work, Foucault reconceptualizes these concepts. Practices of
the self, like the public use of reason, are a response to challenges posed by the present. In a context where
normative modes of thought and action have been rendered problematic due to their normalizing potential,
persons are ‘obliged’, so to speak, to seek out and develop new modes: practices of the self present
themselves as an obligation that can be formulated as ‘Work on yourselves!’. Insofar as practices of the self
both develop those capacities through which one becomes other than what one is and facilitate new forms
of relating to others, freedom can no longer be conceived in terms of obedience. Foucault argues that it is
through transgressing (not adhering to or seeking to re-establish) limits that one ‘[seeks] to give new
impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom’ (Foucault, 1984: 46). Rethinking
freedom in these ways prompts a reconceptualization of autonomy. For Kant, persons possess a unique
quality (the ability to reason) that presents them with a particular burden (the obligation to reason publicly).
For Foucault, our ability to work on ourselves can also be seen as unique and, in turn, presenting us with
the obligation to perform that work. The Foucauldian subject, like its Kantian counterpart, can thus be
understood to constitute itself as autonomous through fulfilling its obligation provided one makes two
important distinctions: the Foucauldian subject positions itself squarely within relations of power, social
and political institutions, and historical context, as well as calls into question rather than affirms its given
subject-position.14 For Foucault as for Kant before him, then, freedom is a function of an autonomous
subject that is obligated to engage publicly in a particular (set of) practice(s) in a particular manner. But for
Foucault the promise of politics may be located in transgressive ‘work’ on both individual and collective
limits in ways that maximize opportunities for practicing freedom.
I believe that a Foucauldian reconceptualization of the political norms of obligation, freedom,
autonomy and (as discussed earlier) publicity, can help to pave the way for a non-normalizing and therefore
potentially emancipatory conception of political unity. Within a political context, unity tends to be
construed in terms of consensus or agreement among political participants. Achieving unity by way of
consensus is not problematic in principle. Applied within a pluralist context, however, the emphasis on
homogeneity inherent within the notion of consensus may result in the further marginalization of already
peripheral political participants, both individual and collective.15 Recent conflict between feminism and the
US political Left illustrates this point. While the relationship between the new social movements and the
Left in the US has always been strained, it became even more conflictual during the late 1990s due, at least
in part, to calls for the left to unify.16 While I do not have sufficient space to fully outline the nature of such
calls here, feminists have argued that the proposed unity could be achieved only by (re)subsuming the new
social movements under the umbrella of, and (re)subordinating their concerns to, the agenda of a more
traditional left politics.17 Again, difference would have to be sacrificed for the sake of unification. As I see
it, unity as a point of contention expresses larger political and philosophical issues and problems, which, if
not addressed, will continue to plague and debilitate emancipatory political efforts. Given the realities of
engaging in political activity within a pluralist society, there can be no recourse to a unified subject with a
coherent identity that can pose and respond to questions regarding political problems, or to some ‘core
issue around which a mass progressive constituency might take shape’ (Isaac, 1998: 144).
Thinking and acting in the company of others within a context where persons do not share an
identity, values, or a common set of beliefs presents an ongoing political challenge. Given this challenge,
rethinking unity in terms of a way of life, as one form that non-normalizing modes of connection between
persons might take, rather than understanding it solely in terms of consensus or abandoning the very
thought of it, may constitute a productive response to prevailing political conditions. While practices of the
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self as Foucault conceives of them are individual and, therefore, concerned with the relationship between
individuals and their socio-political present, it is possible to apply the notion of self-creation to
relationships between groups as well. Freedom presents itself as an obligation to individuals insofar as they
occupy a position within a broader social context. Given that, for Foucault, we are continuously in the
process of negotiating relations of power, ‘being part of a broader context’ implies interaction with that
context, which of course includes other persons. Foucault refers to practices of the self not only in terms of
the fulfillment of a ‘task’ or obligation, but also as marking a ‘relation of belonging’, the notion of
‘belonging’ expressing a strong sense of relation (Foucault, 1984: 39). He conceives of freedom in terms of
‘struggle’, a term which, politically, connotes collective resistance – action (and hence, interaction among
actors) against some obstacle. Moreover, Foucault makes a strong connection between struggle and
material reality. He is less concerned with ‘the representations that men give to themselves, and the
conditions that determine them without their knowledge’ than with ‘what they do and the way they do it’
(1984: 48). More specifically, he concerns himself with the ‘freedom with which they act in . . . practical
systems’, a freedom that is responsive to ‘what others do’ (ibid.).
It is possible and, I think, productive, to think about groups as being similarly positioned within the
context of collective struggles for freedom. From this perspective, particular groups engaged in particular
political struggles are distinct insofar as they occupy a position within the broader political landscape.
Taking the notion of obligation seriously here implies that when groups commit themselves to engaging in
the collective practice of freedom, they also implicitly commit to the more general task of continually recreating and supporting the conditions for the possibility of practicing freedom, without which any
particular political struggle to improve worldly existence will not matter. This is not to posit some inherent
or essential connection between all collective political action, but rather to say that action against
oppression and normalization promotes the possibility of further such action because, from a Foucauldian
perspective, it keeps power relations dynamic (a condition for the possibility of freedom) and thereby
combats the move toward states of domination (static power relations; possibilities for freedom are minimal
or absent).18
My analysis thus far pulls together various strands from Foucault’s work in order to outline some
aspects of a mode of existence that I see emerging within that work over time. This ethos, which I shall
henceforth refer to as a ‘critical life’, emphasizes the importance of facing the present but not being
overcome by it. It confronts persons with both an opportunity and an obligation to begin to challenge
themselves and others to think, act and make connections in non-normalizing ways, to experiment, to take
risks. It calls into question the idea that political forms that have been effective historically will continue to
be viable. And it also seeks to expand opportunities for the practice of freedom.
Yet Foucault’s critics argue that reconceiving norms in ‘potentially’ emancipatory terms and
‘seeking to’ create critical, transformative and non-normalizing modes of living without explaining exactly
what practices of the self look like or the precise way in which they ought to be undertaken such that
emancipatory results are indeed achieved is insufficient. The idea of a critical life appears to be lacking on
the grounds that, insofar as he does not provide guidelines for how such transformation ought to be carried
out, Foucault cannot guarantee that it will be emancipatory: his practices of freedom can easily be
appropriated such that they come to serve oppressive ends. Contra his critics, however, it is not the case
that Foucault cannot provide such guidelines; rather, he simply will not. For Foucault, the notion of
guarantees, of security and certainty, is fundamentally opposed to freedom. Given the normalizing function
that norms may serve, he views attempts to articulate and enforce regulatory, normative principles and
concepts as something akin to totalitarian in nature and, therefore, as undermining the very possibility for
emancipation. As Keith Gandal puts it, Foucault ‘struggled for changes’ but, because ‘he was well
acquainted with both the “futility and the dangers” ’ of guarantees, ‘he eschewed any impulse to lay out a
blueprint for society’ (Gandal, 1986: 124). Considering, if only briefly, the relevance of the notion of a
critical life within a feminist context can provide a means of assessing the efficacy of Foucault’s approach
and also begin to give form to the idea of non-normalizing, emancipatory politics. Because feminists have
traditionally been critical of Foucault’s work, especially as it relates to politics, I will first address and
respond to feminist critiques of Foucault’s notion of practices of the self as presented by Jean Grimshaw
and Lois McNay.19
Grimshaw acknowledges that ‘[t]he theme of “practices of freedom” seems to . . . be an extremely
important one for feminism’, but she nonetheless concludes that Foucault’s conceptualization of such
practices is sorely lacking in terms of its feminist potential (Grimshaw, 1993: 60).20 Grimshaw thinks that
practices of the self as Foucault conceives of them are, like the ancient notion of care of the self,
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characteristically male, that self-creation is merely individual and aesthetic (in the reductive sense of a
lifestyle choice), and that Foucault’s conceptualization of the subject is ‘too thin’ (1993). Grimshaw, as
well as McNay, expresses concern about the lack of normative foundations in Foucault’s work. Grimshaw
argues that the ‘formalistic’ and ‘subject-centered’ nature of Foucault’s notion of self-creation precludes
any discussion of or deliberation about the status of ‘moral absolutes’ (1993). McNay likens Foucault to
‘some postmodern thinkers, particularly Lyotard’, and argues that he ‘employs a vocabulary of political
engagement, using concepts such as free speech, truth, and ethics’ but does not ‘examine . . . the normative
implications of these concepts that shore up his rhetoric of post-humanist ethics remain’ (1992: 139, 141).
Like Habermas, she views Foucault’s work as contradictory, ‘confused’ and normatively lacking (1992:
155). Like Grimshaw, McNay views practices of the self as merely aesthetic, yet she identifies the merely
individual scope of practices of the self as the primary limitation of an aesthetics of existence, because it
deprives such an existence of any political impulse, let alone a feminist one (1992). She argues that ‘the
most serious drawback with Foucault’s presentation of ethics of the self as a solitary process, rather than as
socially integrated activity, is that it is unclear how such an ethics translates into a politics of difference that
could initiate deep-seated social change’ (1992: 177).21
Grimshaw’s and McNay’s remarks reflect the same criticisms of Foucault’s work that I have
addressed in this essay: practices of the self are merely individual; practices of the self are merely aesthetic;
Foucault’s articulation of practices of the self lacks normative content. Having addressed ways in which
Foucault’s work facilitates the reconceptualization of specific norms, at this point I want to consider the
broader, more implicit claim of Grimshaw and McNay that political endeavors require normative
foundations. My concern here is less with whether politics does indeed require such foundations than it is
with the effects of uncritically assuming their necessity. When normativity is seen as a condition for the
possibility of politics it becomes impossible to think about politics in any other terms. Potentially
emancipatory ways of thinking and acting which violate or call into question the necessity of prevailing
political norms are considered anti-political, opposed to freedom, and are therefore rejected. Hence
Foucault’s claims about the link between norms, normalization and oppression: his work points to the
oppressive nature of such uncritical rejection and suggests that norms such as freedom can be rethought
without being abandoned.
Even a cursory look at the history of US feminism suggests that Foucault’s problematization of
prevailing socio-political norms and association of their uncritical acceptance with oppression is consistent
with rather than opposed to the aims of feminist thought and action. Within a context of male dominance
and female subordination, it has always been in feminism’s interests to challenge norms, and feminists
continue to do so. Moreover, within feminism itself, white middle-class women’s uncritical assertion of
their own, limited experiences and perspectives as representative of all women has been challenged as
oppressive: it is not simply the case that some women’s concerns and opinions are voiced while others are
not, but rather it is precisely because some women are excluded and silenced that others are heard. Given
their recognition of ways in which particular norms can function in normalizing and oppressive ways, why
do feminists continue to treat the overarching norm of normativity as foundational and, therefore, outside of
the realm of critique and beyond deliberation? Should feminists not subject it to the same kind of critical
interrogation as norms of male dominance, white supremacy, compulsory heterosexuality, and economic
injustices? My analysis suggests that doing so need not result in the jettisoning of the concept of
normativity. Rather, critically analyzing normativity’s status as a privileged mode of legitimation can
facilitate an understanding both of its function and its effects within feminist discourse, not all of which
may be positive or productive and, indeed, some of which may be oppressive. But it is up to feminists to
determine how this critical work ought to be done, and to do so in the absence of guarantees about its
effectiveness and success. As Karen Vintges argues, feminism aims to ‘make women free so that they can
create new situations, new cultural meanings, and new ways of experiencing what life as a woman can be’
(1999).22 Struggling against women’s oppression opens up opportunities and presents an obligation for
women to create new modes of existence, or ways of life.
Thus understood, feminism seems to be predisposed to this kind of critically creative work – the
work that characterizes a critical life. A critical life offers a vision of an emancipatory, practical politics
that is able to function, even thrive, within a context where traditional foundations for action and thought
are no longer reliable; it does not celebrate the absence of foundations but rather posits a pragmatic
approach to living without them. Insofar as it shows that prevailing modes of existence are not necessary
modes, a critical life makes clear that the demise of normative foundations does not mark the end of
thinking and acting as such. Similarly, while this demise may mark the end of the uncritical deployment of
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accepted political strategies, it does not mark the end of politics. A critically creative approach to politics
provides for a way both of rejecting normalizing political forms and of (continually) developing and
experimenting with new and potentially emancipatory forms.
I think Foucault’s refusal to offer easy or permanent solutions to difficult problems is a large part of
the reason why he is often dismissed as an apolitical thinker, or as one who simply prescribes to a ‘politics
of despair’: asking people to work, and work hard, not only on society but also on themselves without
guidance and with no guarantee of success is not a request many today would grant. Foucault’s belief that it
is impossible to guarantee emancipatory change, together with his attitude toward attempts to provide such
guarantees, help to explain why he refers both to practices of the self and to the practice of freedom as
‘work’: when striving for change in the way that he suggests, ‘we are always in the position of beginning
again’ (1984: 47). While being in such a position need not imply that no meaningful change can happen,
‘that no work can be done except in disorder and contingency’, it does require persons to approach political
activity from the rather unlikely perspective that injustices and oppression are not going to be permanently
eradicated (ibid.). That Foucault thinks politics must be approached from this particular perspective does
not necessarily mean that he believes that injustices and oppression are permanent fixtures. Rather, it
suggests that, given the normalizing potential of norms, this is presently the most pragmatic way to
approach politics.
While I think Foucault is right when he argues that there are no easy solutions, that there is no ‘way
out’ that is not fraught with conflict or even danger, I also think that his political approach provides for a
means not of simply enduring such a situation but of engaging and struggling to transform it. Living a
critical life requires those who take it seriously both to think the thought of change and to put that thought
into practice. To believe that I can be other than what I currently am, that things need not be as they
currently are, that I can relate to persons in ways that I am not yet aware of, is not mere naïveté. It
constitutes an engagement with the present which acknowledges and actively engages with its limits and
constraints but which refuses to see them as insurmountable obstacles. A critical life is a not a life of blind
optimism, false hope, despair, or ‘non-participation’ (Gandal, 1986: 122). It is a life of ‘tactical hyperactivism’, a ‘patient labor giving form to our impatience for liberty’ (ibid.; Foucault, 1984: 50). There is an
inherent risk but also an inherent promise in using Foucault’s ‘tools’; he leaves it to us to decide if the risk
is worth taking.
Dianna Taylor
Department of Philosophy, John Carroll University,
University Heights, OH, USA
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5
Foucault’s work reflects a (seemingly normative) commitment to improving the state of the world, a task that
seems to require at least some (again, seemingly normative) notion of what constitutes ‘improvement’ and how it might
be achieved.
6
See, for example, Volume II of The History of Sexuality: The Use of Pleasure (1990), Volume III of The
History of Sexuality: The Care of the Self (1988a), Technologies of the Self (1988b), and ‘The Ethics of Care for the
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Self as the Practice of Freedom’ (1997b).
7
I see Nietzsche’s influence in Foucault’s reconceptualization of critique in terms of a mode of existence.
Foucault’s understanding of critique as transformative in a specifically transgressive sense is quite similar to
Nietzsche’s notion of the revaluation of all values, which involves calling into question current modes of existence or,
in other words, recognizing contingency where necessity has been assumed; developing new ways of thinking and
acting can occur only as a result or in the context of such critical questioning. Nietzsche’s radical challenge to the
philosophical tradition enables Foucault in some ways to assume the first and crucial component of critique and focus
primarily upon the second: identifying and expanding possibilities for positive change.
8
Foucault illustrates the two aspects or functions of the code by way of the following examples: prescriptively,
‘you’re not supposed to have sex with anyone but your wife’; with respect to value, ‘[y]ou can have a girl in the street
or anywhere, if you have very good feelings toward your wife’ (1997a: 263). The androcentric nature of the examples
notwithstanding, Foucault’s point seems to be that the code provides norms of conduct through which particular kinds
of acts become the content of a problematics of morality.
9
Halperin is not suggesting that there is no relationship between dandyism and Foucault’s notion of self-creation.
Indeed, he argues that Foucault ‘took [dandyism] seriously as a form of ethical self-fashioning . . . [and] selftransformation’ (1995: 73). See David Halperin, ‘The Queer Politics of Michel Foucault’, in Saint Foucault (1995: 15–
125).
10
In her essay, ‘Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder, and Enlarged Thought’, Young develops
a notion of respect that is relevant within a context of difference. It is interesting to note that like Orlie, Young turns to
Hannah Arendt in formulating her ideas on this issue. I find Young’s notion of asymmetrical reciprocity quite
compelling. Problematizing the notion of authenticity, she makes the strong claim that ‘[i]t is neither possible nor
morally desirable for persons engaged in moral interaction to adopt one another’s standpoint’ and argues that within a
context of asymmetry and irreversibility respect is in fact possible only when persons recognize and attempt to
negotiate this impossibility (1997a: 39). Therefore, she argues, ‘understanding’ might be rethought in terms of ‘getting
out of ourselves and learning something new’ (ibid.: 53). While Young formulates the notion of asymmetrical
reciprocity primarily for the purposes of analyzing moral interaction, I think it has important implications for
interaction between political actors at the current historical moment. See Iris Marion Young, ‘Asymmetrical
Reciprocity’ (1997a: 38–59).
11
See Kant, ‘An Answer to the Question: “What is Enlightenment?” ’ (1983: 41–8).
12
It is important to note that Kant is not positing a separate and distinct class of persons, ‘scholars’, who are
entitled to reason publicly while everyone else is necessarily constrained. Rather, he states that ‘the same person does
not act contrary to civic duty when, as a scholar, he publicly’ criticizes public policy (1983: 43; emphasis added).
13
See Dreyfus and Rabinow (1986) on this point.
14
As Jeremy Moss points out, ‘[a]utonomy is not a word that is usually associated with Foucault’s writings’
(1998: 153). Moss argues, however, that a conception of autonomy emerges in Foucault’s later work, specifically
enabled by his notion of the self’s relation to itself. Moss sees Foucault arguing in ‘What is Enlightenment?’, for
example, that ‘we need to constitute ourselves as autonomous beings; that is, while recognizing that the development of
our capacities is a product of our historical circumstances, we nonetheless have (and ethically need) the ability to
perform work on ourselves’ (1998: 154). By Moss’s reading, the fact that subjects are able to submit themselves to
their own transformative efforts implies ‘that subjects have the ability to choose autonomously a course of action or set
of goods’ (ibid.). Autonomy here can be understood, then, as the ability to use and necessity of using ‘[one’s] capacities
reflectively to choose a type of good’, which, for Foucault, is ‘the final shape of one’s capacities’ (where ‘capacities’
are understood as an individual’s ‘moral and intellectual powers’) (ibid.). According to Moss, ‘an autonomous agent is
[thus] one who uses his or her . . . capacities to choose a conception of the good for which he or she can be held
responsible’ (ibid.). Part of what Moss does in his essay is to compare and contrast Foucault’s conceptualization of the
political with that of John Rawls – a project that at points renders Foucault’s work almost unfamiliar. Yet it seems to
me that Moss’s is ultimately a productive exercise, insofar as his aim is not to reduce Foucault’s work to Rawls’s (nor
does he do so) but rather, through looking at Foucault’s work from an unlikely perspective, to explicate political
potential where it otherwise might not be found. Moss (1998).
15
Susan Bickford’s arguments in ‘Listening, Conflict, Citizenship’, Chapter 1 of her book The Dissonance of
Democracy (1996: 1–24), are particularly instructive on this point.
16
I am referring in particular to the First Principles series published in The Nation beginning in April of 1997. See
also Gitlin (1995) and Rorty (1998).
17
See Butler (1998), Willis (1998) and Young (1997b).
18
While similarities exist between my claim and Sartre’s in ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’, there are also
fundamental differences. For Sartre, freedom characterizes the human condition: to be human is to be free. For
Foucault, one is free insofar as one is implicated in power relations; freedom is understood in terms of a response to
one’s present. Moreover, Sartre makes the strong claim that the freedom of one depends upon the freedom of all, just as
the freedom of others depends upon my freedom; the freedom of one is necessarily connected to the freedom of all. The
point that can be derived from Foucault’s work is weaker: practicing freedom reproduces conditions under which the
practice of freedom can occur. See Sartre (2001). For a succinct discussion of the relationship between power and
freedom see Foucault (1983).
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19
Jana Sawicki provides an alternative reading of Foucault on the issues of norms and practices of the self.
According to Sawicki, although Foucault does not theorize traditional normative foundations in his work he
nonetheless does provide ways ‘for distinguishing malevolent and benign or beneficial forms of power’ (1998: 101).
One such way, according to Sawicki, is through his distinction between power and domination. In making this
distinction Foucault ‘denies that all forms of power are pernicious’ (ibid.). Moreover, she argues, Foucault also
distinguishes between various forms of power, such as ‘exploitation, racial and ethnic hegemony, and “subjection”’
(ibid.). With respect to practices of the self, Sawicki argues that they may seem to be merely individualistic because
Foucault is operating on the level of micro-power. She makes the crucial point that ‘Foucault’s principal objective . . .
was to provide tools that subjugated individuals might enlist in a particular set of struggles’, not to develop a general
theory of liberation (1998: 105). Because feminists such as Grimshaw and McNay view freedom and liberation as
ultimately opposed to power, Foucault’s normative commitments will always fall short from their perspectives. See
Sawicki (1998).
20
Grimshaw explicitly states that ‘the ethic of care for the self in antiquity, as described by Foucault, seems lightyears from anything that feminists might want to endorse’ (1993: 65).
21
McNay finds Habermas’s work more appropriate for feminist and political purposes. She argues that
Habermas’s emphasis on the importance of consensus as a regulative ideal highlights the shortcomings of Foucault’s
work for conceptualizing a politics of ‘solidarity’. See ‘Self and Others’, Chapter 5 in Foucault and Feminism (1992).
22
Vintges argues that Foucauldian practices of the self possess both political potential and value for feminism.
In her work on Simone de Beauvoir, Vintges shows that a distinctly ‘feminine’ mode of existence is possible which
does not reify stereotypical notions of femininity or posit essential womanhood. She argues that ‘Beauvoir’s own life
and work amount to the creation of a new ethos as a woman without speaking in the name of woman as an essential
subject, and without a strong articulation of gender’ (1999: 141). As Vintges sees it, Beauvoir’s ‘art of living’ is
exemplary for a contemporary feminism that struggles against women’s oppression as women, on the one hand, but
seeks to wage that struggle in the name of women, on the other. Through self-creation, Beauvoir was able to construct
herself as a woman and to serve as an example to other women, but also to avoid constructing ‘ready-made models for
a common, new identity for women’ (ibid.). Vintges is not, therefore, advocating something akin to cultural feminism –
a ‘women’s culture’ or ‘feminine essence’. She explicitly states: ‘[f]eminists should not have pretensions to truth
discourses’ (1999: 142). As Vintges puts it, arts of living ‘can, of course, have very different contents . . . feminism is
more an umbrella name for all the different styles which try to offer an alternative to the dominant culture’s [notion of]
femininity’ (ibid.). Thus, Vintges is in fact concerned with a feminist art of living (or way of life), and herein lies her
concern with politics. Her work suggests that within the context of a feminist politics, individual difference must be
fundamental to collective action. Like Beauvoir and Foucault before her, she finds normalization extremely
problematic and anti-political and therefore seeks not truth ‘but an ‘ethos . . . formulated in singular rather than plural
terms’ (ibid.).
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